Here we go.

[The One and Only...]

With Kant, a radical change developed in philosophy - instead of experience shaping concepts, concepts began to shape experience. To counteract Humean skepticism, he claimed that ideas like causuality and the self are necessary for experience to even begin.

Kant was wrong.

First, it is obvious that such conceptions are not necessary for experience if the individual can deny them and yet experience none-the-less. I no more have to infer or assume causuality to experience than I have to infer the existence of God. The proof is simple: I do not infer causuality and yet I experience. The same is true with the self: I can avoid identifying the self but the bundle of perceptions yet remain.

It is true that, perhaps, we are born with certain preconceptions, such as I, causuality, or logic. It might also be true that these preconceptions could have been picked up in our unconscious developing stages. How these preconceptions developed is not of concern; what matters is that they are merely preconceptions. They are by no means justified simply in being assumed. In so far as these assumptions are unwarranted, they must be disestablished in order to find truth.

And so lies the crux of my philosophy.

I begin by removing all assumptions, though I retain knowledge of language in order to communicate any meaning. Note that all words ultimately base their meaning on a concept which cannot be further explained by reference to the language - in essense, an abstraction.

It is undeniable that there are phenomenon. Perceptions are by the very meaning of what constitutes existence. Perceptions are abundant; they are in constant flux; yet throughout perceptions, various degrees of consistency exist through their flow. This flow, if you will, is time - it is the abstract concept inferred into perception to explain their continuity; and from consistency evolves the conception of the self. The self are those groups of perception which appear to have a common element of control: I act, I think, I move, and so on and so forth. Here control, as it is taken, is direct and absolute instead of circumstantial. It is not that an outside agent is controlling, but rather that the control is inherent (note: if my meaning here needs further explaination, I can address it later).

In my observation, I note that the more an event occurs in the past, the more it is likely to occur again. This principle is formalized as induction. Induction requires no proof; it cannot be proven. Rather, it is simply a tool construed which corresponds well to reality.

But what is meant by reality?

The only reality I can know is that of my perception. Whether a substance outside or beyond my perception underlies it, be it mind or matter, is unknowable. The various ways of explaining an objective, underlying reality are endless, but there is no reason that perceptions could not simply exist on their own. Thus, I must adopt two positions - existental phenomenalism and metaphysical agnosticism. Existential phenomenalism is the doctrine that the only knowable reality is that of the perceived. Metaphysical agnosticism implies that the fundamental nature of reality cannot be determined.

Edit - Part 2:

As noted before, perceptions occur through time. There are antecedent and subsequent phenomenon through this flow. On some occasions, the correlation of a subsequent event to an antecedent occurance is vast - i kick the ball; the ball moves forward. Here can be inferred causuality, for if causuality is to have any meaning, it can only imply a vast, consistent correlation between given antecedent and subsequent phenomenon. No other meaning is warranted or justifiable.

Yet what of the concept of the ball? Is not the ball merely a collection of phenomenon itself? That of color, of shape, of sound? Cannot it be reduced further?

Yes. However, the ball displays consistent characteristics throughout time. Though it may change position, appearance, or even color in varying circumstances, the consistency is great enough to make inferring a whole useful; and the same is true with all other abstract collections of phenomenon capable of being reduced. The inferrance is a matter of practicality, much like the identification of the self.

And so I infer human beings.

Other humans display many characteristics similar to my own. The correlation of phenomenon amongst them, as well as between them and myself, is very high. Their actions appear indicative of thought and perception when put in reference to my own. Ergo, I infer that other human beings are capable of perceiving and thinking. I cannot know that they are such, but it is reasonable to make that assumption.